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Diffie-Hellman's elegance arises from deep mathematical structures that have been studied for centuries. The protocol isn't merely a clever trick—it's built on the rigorous foundations of abstract algebra, number theory, and computational complexity theory.
Understanding these foundations accomplishes two critical goals: it illuminates why the protocol works rather than just how, and it equips you to reason about security guarantees and potential weaknesses. Engineers who understand the mathematics can make informed decisions about parameter selection, evaluate new attacks, and understand why certain variations (like ECDH) offer efficiency improvements.
By the end of this page, you will understand group theory fundamentals as they apply to cryptography, the structure of the multiplicative group modulo a prime, what makes a good generator, the precise hardness assumptions underlying DH security, and how computational complexity informs our security estimates.
At the heart of Diffie-Hellman lies the mathematical structure called a group. While this might seem like abstract formalism, it's precisely this structure that enables secure key exchange.
Definition: A Group
A group (G, •) consists of:
Satisfying four axioms:
Optional additional property:
The groups used in Diffie-Hellman are abelian (commutative). This commutativity is exactly what makes the protocol work: (g^a)^b = (g^b)^a.
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"""Examples of Groups Relevant to Cryptography Understanding groups through concrete examples helpsbuild intuition for the abstract definitions.""" # EXAMPLE 1: The integers under addition (Z, +)# ============================================# Set: {..., -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, ...}# Operation: addition (+)# Identity: 0 (since a + 0 = a)# Inverse of a: -a (since a + (-a) = 0)# This is an INFINITE group # EXAMPLE 2: Integers modulo n under addition (Z_n, +)# ===================================================# Set: {0, 1, 2, ..., n-1}# Operation: addition mod n# Identity: 0# Inverse of a: (n - a) mod n def addition_group_mod_n(n: int): """Demonstrate Z_n under addition.""" print(f"Group Z_{n} under addition:") print(f" Elements: {{0, 1, ..., {n-1}}}") print(f" Identity: 0") # Show some operations a, b = 3, 5 result = (a + b) % n print(f" Example: {a} + {b} = {result} (mod {n})") # Show inverses for x in range(n): inv = (n - x) % n check = (x + inv) % n print(f" Inverse of {x}: {inv} (check: {x}+{inv}={check})") # EXAMPLE 3: Multiplicative group modulo p (Z*_p, ×)# THIS IS THE GROUP USED IN DIFFIE-HELLMAN!# =================================================# Set: {1, 2, 3, ..., p-1} (all integers from 1 to p-1)# Operation: multiplication mod p# Identity: 1 (since a × 1 = a)# Closure: For prime p, if a,b ≠ 0 mod p, then ab ≠ 0 mod p def multiplicative_group_mod_p(p: int): """ Demonstrate Z*_p - the multiplicative group modulo prime p. This is the group Diffie-Hellman operates in! """ print(f"Multiplicative Group Z*_{p}:") print(f" Elements: {{1, 2, ..., {p-1}}}") print(f" Order (size): {p-1}") print(f" Identity: 1") # Show multiplication table for small p if p <= 7: print(f" Multiplication table:") for a in range(1, p): row = [str((a * b) % p) for b in range(1, p)] print(f" {a}: {' '.join(row)}") # Compute inverses using Fermat's little theorem # a^(p-1) ≡ 1 mod p, so a^(p-2) ≡ a^(-1) mod p print(f" Inverses (a × a⁻¹ ≡ 1 mod {p}):") for a in range(1, p): inv = pow(a, p-2, p) # a^(p-2) mod p check = (a * inv) % p print(f" {a}⁻¹ = {inv} (check: {a}×{inv} ≡ {check})") # Run examplesaddition_group_mod_n(6)multiplicative_group_mod_p(7) # KEY INSIGHT: Why we need p to be PRIME# =====================================# For composite n, Z*_n has fewer elements (those coprime to n)# and the structure is more complex. Primes give clean groups. print("" + "="*50)print("Why primes? Compare Z*_8 vs Z*_7:")print("Z*_8 = {1,3,5,7} - elements coprime to 8, size = 4")print("Z*_7 = {1,2,3,4,5,6} - all non-zero elements, size = 6")print("Primes give maximal, well-structured groups.")The group structure guarantees that all DH operations stay within a well-defined set, every public key has a unique shared secret for any private key, and the mathematical properties (like commutativity) that make the protocol work are guaranteed.
Diffie-Hellman operates specifically in the multiplicative group of integers modulo a prime p, denoted Z*_p (also written as (ℤ/pℤ)*). Let's examine this structure carefully.
Definition:
$$\mathbb{Z}_p^* = {1, 2, 3, \ldots, p-1}$$
with the operation being multiplication modulo p.
Key properties:
Size (order): |Z*_p| = p - 1. This is critical for security analysis.
Closure: For any a, b ∈ Z_p, the product ab mod p is also in Z_p. This is guaranteed because p is prime: if p doesn't divide a or b, it can't divide ab.
Inverses exist: For every element a ∈ Z*_p, there exists a unique a⁻¹ such that a × a⁻¹ ≡ 1 (mod p). This follows from Bézout's identity and Fermat's little theorem.
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"""Deep Dive into Modular Arithmetic for Cryptography Understanding these operations is essential for implementingand analyzing Diffie-Hellman correctly.""" def extended_gcd(a: int, b: int) -> tuple[int, int, int]: """ Extended Euclidean Algorithm. Returns (gcd, x, y) such that: a*x + b*y = gcd(a, b) This is fundamental for computing modular inverses. """ if a == 0: return b, 0, 1 gcd, x1, y1 = extended_gcd(b % a, a) x = y1 - (b // a) * x1 y = x1 return gcd, x, y def modular_inverse(a: int, p: int) -> int: """ Compute the multiplicative inverse of a modulo p. Two methods: 1. Extended GCD: a*x + p*y = 1, so a*x ≡ 1 (mod p) 2. Fermat: a^(p-1) ≡ 1 (mod p), so a^(p-2) ≡ a⁻¹ (mod p) """ # Method 1: Extended GCD gcd, x, _ = extended_gcd(a, p) if gcd != 1: raise ValueError(f"{a} has no inverse modulo {p}") return x % p def fermats_little_theorem_demo(p: int): """ Demonstrate Fermat's Little Theorem: a^(p-1) ≡ 1 (mod p) for all a in Z*_p This is the cornerstone of modular arithmetic in cryptography. """ print(f"Fermat's Little Theorem for p = {p}:") print(f"For all a ∈ {{1,2,...,{p-1}}}: a^{p-1} ≡ 1 (mod {p})") print() for a in range(1, p): result = pow(a, p-1, p) # Show the exponentiation steps for small values if p <= 11: intermediate = a steps = [str(a)] for i in range(2, p): intermediate = (intermediate * a) % p if i == p-1: steps.append(f"... a^{i} = {intermediate}") elif i <= 4: steps.append(f"a^{i}={intermediate}") print(f" a={a}: {' → '.join(steps[:4])} → a^{p-1} = {result}") else: print(f" a={a}: a^{p-1} mod {p} = {result}") print(f"All results are 1 ✓") def group_structure_analysis(p: int): """ Analyze the structure of Z*_p. Key concepts: - Order of an element - Primitive roots (generators) - Subgroup structure """ print(f"{'='*50}") print(f"GROUP STRUCTURE OF Z*_{p}") print(f"{'='*50}") print(f"Group size: |Z*_{p}| = {p-1}") # Find the order of each element # Order of a = smallest k such that a^k ≡ 1 (mod p) print(f"Orders of elements:") generators = [] for a in range(1, p): power = 1 order = 0 for k in range(1, p): power = (power * a) % p if power == 1: order = k break is_generator = (order == p - 1) if is_generator: generators.append(a) label = "← GENERATOR" if is_generator else "" print(f" ord({a}) = {order} {label}") print(f"Primitive roots (generators): {generators}") print(f"Number of generators: {len(generators)}") print(f"Expected: φ({p-1}) = {euler_phi(p-1)}") return generators def euler_phi(n: int) -> int: """Euler's totient function: count of integers ≤ n coprime to n.""" result = 0 for i in range(1, n + 1): if gcd(i, n) == 1: result += 1 return result def gcd(a: int, b: int) -> int: """Greatest common divisor via Euclidean algorithm.""" while b: a, b = b, a % b return a # Demonstrationsfermats_little_theorem_demo(7)generators = group_structure_analysis(11) print(f"{'='*50}")print("WHY GENERATORS MATTER FOR DIFFIE-HELLMAN")print(f"{'='*50}")print("A generator g produces ALL elements of the group:")for gen in generators[:2]: print(f"Generator g = {gen}:") elements = [] power = 1 for i in range(1, 11): power = (power * gen) % 11 elements.append(power) print(f" Powers: g^1, g^2, ..., g^10 = {elements}") print(f" Produces all {len(set(elements))} elements ✓")For any a in Z*_p: a^(p-1) ≡ 1 (mod p). This theorem is used constantly: to compute inverses (a⁻¹ = a^(p-2)), to find element orders, and in security proofs. It's why DH operations 'wrap around' predictably.
A primitive root (or generator) of Z*_p is an element g whose powers produce every element of the group. This concept is central to DH security.
Definition:
An element g ∈ Z*_p is a primitive root modulo p if:
$${g^1 \mod p, g^2 \mod p, \ldots, g^{p-1} \mod p} = {1, 2, 3, \ldots, p-1}$$
In group theory terms, g is a generator if its order equals the group order p-1.
Order of an element:
The order of a ∈ Z*_p, written ord(a), is the smallest positive integer k such that a^k ≡ 1 (mod p).
| Element a | Sequence a, a², a³, ... mod 11 | Order | Is Generator? |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 1 | 1 | No |
| 2 | 2, 4, 8, 5, 10, 9, 7, 3, 6, 1 | 10 | ✓ YES |
| 3 | 3, 9, 5, 4, 1 | 5 | No |
| 4 | 4, 5, 9, 3, 1 | 5 | No |
| 5 | 5, 3, 4, 9, 1 | 5 | No |
| 6 | 6, 3, 7, 9, 10, 5, 8, 4, 2, 1 | 10 | ✓ YES |
| 7 | 7, 5, 2, 3, 10, 4, 6, 9, 8, 1 | 10 | ✓ YES |
| 8 | 8, 9, 6, 4, 10, 3, 2, 5, 7, 1 | 10 | ✓ YES |
| 9 | 9, 4, 3, 5, 1 | 5 | No |
| 10 | 10, 1 | 2 | No |
Key observations:
Not every element is a generator. In Z*_11, only 4 out of 10 elements are generators.
Order divides group order. By Lagrange's theorem, ord(a) always divides |Z*_p| = p-1.
Number of generators. There are exactly φ(p-1) primitive roots modulo p, where φ is Euler's totient function.
Security implication: If the generator has small order, the discrete log problem becomes easier. We want generators of maximal order.
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"""Generator Selection and Verification Choosing and verifying generators is critical for DH security.Incorrect choice can catastrophically weaken the protocol.""" def is_generator(g: int, p: int) -> bool: """ Check if g is a primitive root modulo p. Efficient test: g is a generator iff g^((p-1)/q) ≠ 1 mod p for all prime factors q of (p-1). This is much faster than computing all powers. """ from sympy import primefactors order = p - 1 factors = primefactors(order) for q in factors: # Check g^((p-1)/q) mod p exponent = order // q if pow(g, exponent, p) == 1: # g has order dividing (p-1)/q, so it's NOT a generator return False return True def find_all_generators(p: int) -> list[int]: """Find all primitive roots modulo prime p.""" return [g for g in range(2, p) if is_generator(g, p)] def verify_safe_prime_generator(p: int, g: int) -> dict: """ For safe primes p = 2q + 1, verify generator properties. Safe primes are special because (p-1) = 2q has only two prime factors: 2 and q. This makes generator verification simple. """ from sympy import isprime q = (p - 1) // 2 results = { "p": p, "is_prime": isprime(p), "q = (p-1)/2": q, "q_is_prime": isprime(q), "is_safe_prime": isprime(p) and isprime(q), "g": g, } if results["is_safe_prime"]: # For safe primes, g is a generator iff: # g^2 ≠ 1 mod p (rules out g = ±1) # g^q ≠ 1 mod p (rules out quadratic residues) g_squared = pow(g, 2, p) g_to_q = pow(g, q, p) results["g^2 mod p"] = g_squared results["g^q mod p"] = g_to_q results["is_generator"] = (g_squared != 1) and (g_to_q != 1) return results def subgroup_attack_demo(): """ Demonstrate why small-order subgroups are dangerous. If an attacker can force key exchange into a small subgroup, the discrete log becomes easy within that subgroup. """ print("SMALL SUBGROUP ATTACK DEMONSTRATION") print("="*50) # Consider a prime p where p-1 has a small factor p = 97 # p - 1 = 96 = 2^5 * 3 # Find an element of small order for g in range(2, p): order = 1 val = g while val != 1: val = (val * g) % p order += 1 if order == 3: # Found small-order element print(f"Element {g} has order {order}") print(f"Subgroup: {{{g}^1={g}, {g}^2={pow(g,2,p)}, {g}^3={pow(g,3,p)}=1}}") print() print("If attacker forces Bob to use this subgroup,") print("the shared secret can only be one of 3 values!") print("Brute force becomes trivial.") break print() print("MITIGATION: Use safe primes!") print("For safe prime p = 2q+1, the only subgroups have") print("orders 1, 2, q, and 2q. No small subgroups exist.") # Demoprint("Generators of Z*_23:")gens = find_all_generators(23)print(f"Generators: {gens}")print(f"Count: {len(gens)}") print("Verifying g=5 for p=23 (safe prime, q=11):")result = verify_safe_prime_generator(23, 5)for k, v in result.items(): print(f" {k}: {v}") print()subgroup_attack_demo()A safe prime p = 2q + 1 (where q is also prime) ensures Z*_p has no small subgroups. This is why safe primes or validated groups from standards are essential. Using arbitrary primes risks devastating subgroup attacks.
The security of Diffie-Hellman depends on the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) being computationally intractable. Let's define it precisely and examine why it's believed to be hard.
Formal Definition:
Given: A prime p, a generator g of Z_p, and an element h ∈ Z_p
Find: The unique integer x ∈ [0, p-2] such that g^x ≡ h (mod p)
We write x = log_g(h) and call x the discrete logarithm of h base g.
Why "discrete"?
Unlike continuous logarithms (where ln(ab) = ln(a) + ln(b) provides algebraic tools), the modular structure destroys these relationships. Values "wrap around," and there's no smooth function to invert.
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"""Discrete Logarithm Algorithms: From Naive to Number Field Sieve Understanding attack algorithms helps appreciate parameter choice.""" import mathfrom collections import defaultdict def naive_discrete_log(h: int, g: int, p: int) -> int: """ Naive algorithm: try each exponent sequentially. Time complexity: O(p) Space complexity: O(1) For 2048-bit p, this requires ~10^600 operations. Completely impractical. """ power = 1 for x in range(p): if power == h: return x power = (power * g) % p return -1 def baby_step_giant_step(h: int, g: int, p: int) -> int: """ Shanks' Baby-Step Giant-Step Algorithm. Time complexity: O(√p) Space complexity: O(√p) Key insight: if x = im + j where m = ⌈√n⌉, then g^x = g^(im+j) implies g^j = h * (g^-m)^i "Baby steps": precompute g^j for j = 0..m-1 "Giant steps": compute h * (g^-m)^i for i = 0..m-1 Look for collision. """ n = p - 1 # Group order m = int(math.ceil(math.sqrt(n))) # Baby steps: build lookup table g^j -> j baby_steps = {} power = 1 for j in range(m): baby_steps[power] = j power = (power * g) % p # Compute g^(-m) mod p g_inv_m = pow(g, -m, p) # Python 3.8+ supports negative exponents # Giant steps: look for collision gamma = h for i in range(m): if gamma in baby_steps: j = baby_steps[gamma] x = i * m + j # Verify if pow(g, x, p) == h: return x gamma = (gamma * g_inv_m) % p return -1 def pollard_rho(h: int, g: int, p: int) -> int: """ Pollard's Rho Algorithm for Discrete Log. Time complexity: O(√p) Space complexity: O(1) Uses cycle detection (like for detecting linked list cycles). More memory-efficient than baby-step giant-step. """ # This is a simplified conceptual version # Full implementation requires careful handling of random walk n = p - 1 # Group order def f(x, a, b): """Partition {1,...,p-1} into 3 sets; define iteration.""" s = x % 3 if s == 0: return (x * x) % p, (2 * a) % n, (2 * b) % n elif s == 1: return (x * g) % p, (a + 1) % n, b else: return (x * h) % p, a, (b + 1) % n # Start Floyd's cycle-detection x, a, b = 1, 0, 0 X, A, B = x, a, b for _ in range(n): x, a, b = f(x, a, b) X, A, B = f(*f(X, A, B)) # X moves twice as fast if x == X: # Collision: g^a * h^b = g^A * h^B # So h^(b-B) = g^(A-a) # If b ≠ B: h = g^((A-a)/(b-B)) r = (b - B) % n if r != 0: from math import gcd d = gcd(r, n) if d == 1: result = ((A - a) * pow(r, -1, n)) % n if pow(g, result, p) == h: return result break return -1 def complexity_comparison(): """ Compare algorithm complexities for different prime sizes. """ print("DISCRETE LOG ALGORITHM COMPLEXITIES") print("="*60) print() bit_sizes = [64, 128, 256, 512, 1024, 2048, 3072] print(f"{'Bits':>6} | {'Naive O(p)':>15} | {'Baby-Giant O(√p)':>18} | {'NFS (subexp)':>15}") print("-" * 60) for bits in bit_sizes: p = 2**bits naive = p baby_giant = int(math.sqrt(p)) # Number Field Sieve: L_p[1/3, c] ≈ exp(c * (ln p)^(1/3) * (ln ln p)^(2/3)) # Simplified approximation nfs = int(math.exp(1.9 * (bits * math.log(2))**(1/3) * (math.log(bits * math.log(2)))**(2/3))) naive_str = f"2^{bits}" baby_str = f"2^{bits//2}" nfs_str = f"~2^{int(math.log2(nfs))}" if nfs > 0 else "~2^?" print(f"{bits:>6} | {naive_str:>15} | {baby_str:>18} | {nfs_str:>15}") print() print("Notes:") print("- 2^80 operations ≈ 1 year on powerful hardware (security boundary)") print("- 2^112 operations ≈ practical limit for nation-states") print("- 2^128+ operations ≈ currently infeasible") print("- 2048-bit primes give ~112-bit security") print("- 3072-bit primes give ~128-bit security") # Demo on small primesprint("Discrete log examples on small primes:")test_cases = [ (11, 2, 7), # Find x such that 2^x ≡ 7 (mod 11) (23, 5, 8), # Find x such that 5^x ≡ 8 (mod 23)] for p, g, h in test_cases: x_naive = naive_discrete_log(h, g, p) x_baby = baby_step_giant_step(h, g, p) print(f"Solve {g}^x ≡ {h} (mod {p})") print(f" Naive: x = {x_naive}") print(f" Baby-Giant: x = {x_baby}") print(f" Verify: {g}^{x_naive} mod {p} = {pow(g, x_naive, p)}") print() complexity_comparison()| Algorithm | Time Complexity | Space | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brute Force | O(p) | O(1) | Try each exponent; completely impractical |
| Baby-step Giant-step | O(√p) | O(√p) | Time-space tradeoff; still exponential |
| Pollard's Rho | O(√p) | O(1) | Random walk; more practical than BSGS |
| Pollard's Kangaroo | O(√p) | O(1) | When log is known to lie in interval |
| Index Calculus | Subexponential | Large | Uses factor base; specific to Z*_p |
| Number Field Sieve | L_p[1/3, 1.9] | Massive | Best for very large p; used in records |
The Number Field Sieve runs in time L_p[1/3, c] = exp(c · (ln p)^(1/3) · (ln ln p)^(2/3)). This is subexponential but superpolynomial—still infeasible for 2048+ bit primes, but faster than √p. This is why EC-based DH (next module) is more efficient.
Cryptographic security proofs reduce to hardness assumptions. For Diffie-Hellman, three related but distinct problems are relevant:
1. Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP):
2. Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem:
3. Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Problem:
Why these distinctions matter:
Are these actually hard?
No mathematical proof exists that DLP is hard. However:
| Year | Bits | Method | Time/Resources |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 1024 | NFS (special prime) | ~2 months, many cores |
| 2019 | 795 | NFS (general) | ~3100 core-years |
| 2023 | 912 | NFS | Massive compute cluster |
| — | 2048+ | — | Currently infeasible |
The 2015 Logjam attack showed that 512-bit and 768-bit DH primes could be broken in practical time. Even 1024-bit groups are within reach of well-funded adversaries. The current recommendation is 2048-bit minimum, with 3072-bit for long-term security.
It's reasonable to ask: why is modular exponentiation hard to invert when regular exponentiation is easy? Understanding this provides intuition for the security model.
Regular logarithm:
Given y = 10^x, finding x is trivial:
Discrete logarithm:
Given y = 10^x mod 101, finding x is hard:
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"""Visualizing Why Modular Arithmetic Creates Hardness The 'chaos' introduced by modular reduction is whydiscrete logarithms are hard.""" def visualize_modular_sequence(g: int, p: int): """ Show how modular exponentiation scrambles values. """ print(f"Powers of {g} modulo {p}:") print("=" * 50) powers = [] val = 1 for i in range(1, p): val = (val * g) % p powers.append(val) print(f" {g}^{i:2} mod {p} = {val:3}", end="") # Show as "percentage" of range for visual bar_len = int(val * 40 / p) print(f" |{'#' * bar_len}") print() print("Observations:") print(f" - Values jump unpredictably between 1 and {p-1}") print(f" - No monotonic pattern") print(f" - Knowing g^x doesn't help find g^(x+1) without knowing x") print(f" - The only structure: values eventually cycle with period {p-1}") return powers def statistical_analysis(g: int, p: int): """ Analyze statistical properties of the sequence. A good cryptographic group should have: - Uniform distribution - Long period - No discernible pattern """ from statistics import mean, stdev powers = [] val = 1 for i in range(1, p): val = (val * g) % p powers.append(val) print(f"Statistical Analysis (g={g}, p={p}):") print(f" Period: {len(powers)}") print(f" Mean: {mean(powers):.2f} (expected: {(p-1)/2:.2f})") print(f" StdDev: {stdev(powers):.2f} (uniform would be ~{(p-1)/(2*1.73):.2f})") # Check if all values appear exactly once unique = set(powers) if len(unique) == p - 1: print(f" Generator: YES (all {p-1} non-zero values appear)") else: print(f" Generator: NO (only {len(unique)} unique values)") def compare_continuous_discrete(): """ Compare continuous vs discrete logarithms. """ import math print("CONTINUOUS VS DISCRETE LOGARITHM") print("=" * 50) # Continuous: finding x such that 10^x = y y_continuous = 1000 x_continuous = math.log10(y_continuous) print(f"Continuous: 10^x = 1000") print(f" Solution: x = log₁₀(1000) = {x_continuous}") print(f" Method: Direct formula, O(1)") # Discrete: finding x such that 10^x ≡ y (mod 101) g, p, y_discrete = 10, 101, 78 print(f"Discrete: 10^x ≡ {y_discrete} (mod 101)") # Find by brute force val = 1 for x in range(1, p): val = (val * g) % p if val == y_discrete: print(f" Solution: x = {x}") break print(f" Method: Must try values (at best O(√p))") print(f" Why hard: modular reduction destroys log properties:") print(f" log(ab mod p) ≠ log(a) + log(b)") # Run demonstrationsvisualize_modular_sequence(3, 17)statistical_analysis(5, 23)compare_continuous_discrete()Modular reduction is a many-to-one mapping. Many different products can reduce to the same value mod p. This ambiguity—this 'information loss'—is what makes inversion hard. The discrete log problem asks you to recover information that has been systematically destroyed.
The mathematics we've covered directly informs how DH parameters should be chosen in practice. Each mathematical concept translates to a specific security requirement.
| Security Level | Prime Size (bits) | Comparable Symmetric | Use Case |
|---|---|---|---|
| 112-bit | 2048 | 3DES, AES-128 | General purpose, current standard |
| 128-bit | 3072 | AES-128+ | Medium-term security (10+ years) |
| 192-bit | 7680 | AES-192 | Long-term, high security |
| 256-bit | 15360 | AES-256 | Post-quantum consideration (pre-QC) |
For new deployments: use either RFC 7919 FFDHE groups (if you must use traditional DH) or switch entirely to ECDH with curves like X25519 or P-256. ECDH provides equivalent security with much smaller key sizes and faster operations.
We've built a rigorous mathematical foundation for understanding Diffie-Hellman security. Let's consolidate these concepts:
What's next:
With the mathematical foundation established, we'll explore a crucial security property that modern systems demand: forward secrecy. You'll learn why key reuse is dangerous, how ephemeral keys protect past sessions, and why protocols like TLS 1.3 mandate ephemeral Diffie-Hellman.
You now understand the algebraic structures underlying Diffie-Hellman: groups, modular arithmetic, generators, and the discrete logarithm problem. This foundation explains why the protocol is secure and how to choose parameters correctly. Next, we examine forward secrecy and its critical importance.