Container Isolation

Throughout this module, we've explored the fundamental building blocks of sandboxing: the sandbox concept, process isolation, system call filtering, and seccomp. Now we bring these mechanisms together to examine container isolation—perhaps the most impactful application of sandboxing technology in modern computing.

Containers have revolutionized software deployment. They package applications with their dependencies, run isolated from other containers and the host, and enable efficient resource utilization. But containers are not virtual machines—they share a kernel with the host. This kernel sharing is both their strength (efficiency, performance) and their challenge (a shared kernel is a shared attack surface).

Understanding container isolation is essential for anyone working with modern infrastructure. Containers are everywhere: microservices, CI/CD pipelines, cloud functions, edge computing. Their security properties directly impact the security of countless production systems.

A container is an isolated execution environment that provides a consistent runtime for applications. Unlike virtual machines, which emulate hardware and run a complete guest kernel, containers share the host kernel while maintaining isolation at the resource and namespace level.

Container vs. VM Isolation:

The Container Abstraction Stack:

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                 User Application                      │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│                Container Runtime                      │
│  (containerd, CRI-O, Docker Engine)                   │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│                   OCI Runtime                         │
│  (runc, crun, gVisor runsc, Kata Containers)         │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│                 Linux Kernel                          │
│  Namespaces | cgroups | seccomp | Capabilities | LSM │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│                    Hardware                           │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Container runtimes manage container lifecycle (create, start, stop, delete). OCI runtimes actually execute containers according to the Open Container Initiative specification. The OCI runtime interfaces directly with kernel isolation primitives.

Containers typically use all available namespace types to create comprehensive isolation. Each namespace isolates a different aspect of the system view:

Standard Container Namespaces:

Creating a Container's Namespace Set:

When a container starts, the runtime creates a new set of namespaces:

// Simplified container namespace creation
int container_flags = CLONE_NEWNS    // Mount namespace
                    | CLONE_NEWPID   // PID namespace
                    | CLONE_NEWNET   // Network namespace
                    | CLONE_NEWUTS   // UTS namespace
                    | CLONE_NEWIPC   // IPC namespace
                    | CLONE_NEWUSER  // User namespace (if rootless)
                    | CLONE_NEWCGROUP; // Cgroup namespace

int pid = clone(container_init, stack_top, container_flags, arg);

Network Namespace Configuration:

Containers need network connectivity despite having isolated network stacks. Common approaches:

# Create virtual ethernet pair
ip link add veth-host type veth peer name veth-container

# Move one end to container's network namespace
ip link set veth-container netns container_pid

# Configure host side (connect to bridge)
ip link set veth-host up
ip link set veth-host master docker0

# Configure container side
nsenter -t $container_pid -n ip addr add 172.17.0.2/16 dev veth-container
nsenter -t $container_pid -n ip link set veth-container up
nsenter -t $container_pid -n ip route add default via 172.17.0.1

User Namespace and Rootless Containers:

User namespaces enable rootless containers—containers that run without any host privileges. The container's root is mapped to an unprivileged host user:

# Container root (UID 0) is mapped to host UID 100000
$ cat /proc/$container_pid/uid_map
         0     100000      65536
         
# Inside container: I'm root!
root@container# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)

# But on host: just UID 100000
$ ls -l /proc/$container_pid/exe
-rwxr-xr-x 1 100000 100000 ... /usr/bin/myapp

Rootless containers provide an additional security layer: even if an attacker escapes the container, they end up as an unprivileged host user.

While namespaces isolate visibility of resources, cgroups (control groups) isolate consumption of resources. Every container runs in its own cgroup with configured limits.

Container cgroup Configuration:

# Container's cgroup (cgroup v2)
/sys/fs/cgroup/system.slice/docker-abc123def.scope/

# Memory limit: 512MB
echo "536870912" > memory.max

# CPU limit: 50% of one core
echo "50000 100000" > cpu.max

# Max 100 processes
echo "100" > pids.max

# I/O rate limits
echo "8:0 wbps=10485760" > io.max  # 10 MB/s write to device 8:0

Resource Protection Properties:

Memory Limit Behavior:

When a container exceeds its memory limit, the kernel's OOM (Out of Memory) killer is invoked. cgroup v2 provides more predictable behavior:

# Set memory limit
echo "536870912" > /sys/fs/cgroup/container_cgroup/memory.max

# When limit exceeded:
# - If memory.oom.group = 1: all processes in cgroup killed
# - If memory.oom.group = 0: kernel picks individual processes

# For containers, prefer killing all (consistent state)
echo "1" > memory.oom.group

CPU Throttling:

# Format: "quota period" in microseconds
# This gives 50% of one CPU (50ms every 100ms)
echo "50000 100000" > cpu.max

# For 2 full CPUs worth:
echo "200000 100000" > cpu.max

# For soft limits (doesn't hard-cap, just for scheduling priority)
echo "150" > cpu.weight  # Default is 100

Container runtimes apply seccomp profiles to restrict syscalls available to containerized processes. Docker, Kubernetes, and other platforms support configurable seccomp policies.

Docker Default seccomp Profile:

Docker's default profile blocks approximately 44 syscalls (as of Docker 20.10):

{
    "defaultAction": "SCMP_ACT_ERRNO",
    "defaultErrnoRet": 1,
    "archMap": [
        {
            "architecture": "SCMP_ARCH_X86_64",
            "subArchitectures": ["SCMP_ARCH_X86", "SCMP_ARCH_X32"]
        }
    ],
    "syscalls": [
        {
            "names": [
                "accept", "accept4", "access", "adjtimex", "alarm",
                "bind", "brk", "capget", "capset", "chdir", ...
            ],
            "action": "SCMP_ACT_ALLOW"
        }
    ]
}

Blocked by Default:

acct, add_key, bpf, clock_adjtime, clock_settime, clone (with CLONE_NEWUSER),
create_module, delete_module, finit_module, get_kernel_syms, get_mempolicy,
init_module, ioperm, iopl, kcmp, kexec_file_load, kexec_load, keyctl,
lookup_dcookie, mbind, mount, move_pages, name_to_handle_at, nfsservctl,
open_by_handle_at, perf_event_open, personality, pivot_root, process_vm_readv,
process_vm_writev, ptrace, query_module, quotactl, reboot, request_key,
set_mempolicy, setns, settimeofday, stime, swapon, swapoff, sysfs, _sysctl,
umount, umount2, unshare, uselib, userfaultfd, ustat, vm86, vm86old

Kubernetes seccomp Profiles:

Kubernetes supports seccomp through security contexts:

apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: secure-pod
spec:
  securityContext:
    seccompProfile:
      type: RuntimeDefault  # Use container runtime's default
  containers:
  - name: app
    image: myapp:latest

Profile Types:

Custom Profile Example:

apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: custom-seccomp-pod
spec:
  securityContext:
    seccompProfile:
      type: Localhost
      localhostProfile: profiles/strict.json
  containers:
  - name: app
    image: myapp:latest

// /var/lib/kubelet/seccomp/profiles/strict.json
{
    "defaultAction": "SCMP_ACT_ERRNO",
    "syscalls": [
        {
            "names": ["read", "write", "exit_group", "futex", "mmap"],
            "action": "SCMP_ACT_ALLOW"
        }
    ]
}

Linux capabilities provide fine-grained privilege control. Container runtimes drop most capabilities by default, granting only what's needed for typical containerized applications.

Docker Default Capabilities:

Granted by default:
CAP_CHOWN, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, CAP_FSETID, CAP_FOWNER, CAP_MKNOD,
CAP_NET_RAW, CAP_SETGID, CAP_SETUID, CAP_SETFCAP, CAP_SETPCAP,
CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE, CAP_SYS_CHROOT, CAP_KILL, CAP_AUDIT_WRITE

Notably NOT granted:
CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, CAP_SYS_MODULE,
CAP_SYS_TIME, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE, CAP_SYS_BOOT, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, ...

Modifying Capabilities:

# Drop all capabilities
docker run --cap-drop=ALL myimage

# Drop all, add specific ones back
docker run --cap-drop=ALL --cap-add=NET_BIND_SERVICE myimage

# Add a capability (dangerous!)
docker run --cap-add=SYS_PTRACE myimage

Kubernetes Capability Configuration:

apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
spec:
  containers:
  - name: app
    image: myapp:latest
    securityContext:
      capabilities:
        drop:
          - ALL
        add:
          - NET_BIND_SERVICE

Mandatory Access Control (MAC) systems provide an additional security layer by enforcing policies that even root cannot bypass. Docker and Kubernetes support both AppArmor (Ubuntu/Debian default) and SELinux (RHEL/CentOS default).

AppArmor for Containers:

Docker applies a default AppArmor profile (docker-default) that restricts:

• Mount operations
• Ptrace
• Signal handling
• Certain network operations

# View Docker's default profile
cat /etc/apparmor.d/docker-default

# Use custom profile
docker run --security-opt apparmor=my-custom-profile myimage

# Disable AppArmor (not recommended)
docker run --security-opt apparmor=unconfined myimage

Custom AppArmor Profile:

#include <tunables/global>

profile docker-nginx flags=(attach_disconnected,mediate_deleted) {
  #include <abstractions/base>
  #include <abstractions/nameservice>
  
  network inet tcp,
  network inet udp,
  
  /usr/sbin/nginx mr,
  /var/log/nginx/* w,
  /etc/nginx/** r,
  /var/www/** r,
  
  # Deny dangerous operations
  deny mount,
  deny ptrace,
  deny @{PROC}/* w,
}

SELinux for Containers:

SELinux provides type enforcement, labeling all processes and files with security contexts:

# View container's SELinux context
ps -eZ | grep container
# system_u:system_r:container_t:s0:c123,c456  ... my-container

# Custom SELinux label
docker run --security-opt label=type:custom_container_t myimage

# Disable SELinux confinement (dangerous)
docker run --security-opt label=disable myimage

SELinux Container Policy:

• container_t — Standard container type, restricted access
• container_init_t — Container init processes
• container_runtime_t — Container runtime (Docker/containerd)

Kubernetes SELinux Options:

apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
spec:
  securityContext:
    seLinuxOptions:
      level: "s0:c123,c456"  # MCS categories for isolation
  containers:
  - name: app
    securityContext:
      seLinuxOptions:
        type: container_t

Despite all isolation mechanisms, container escapes remain possible. Understanding escape vectors helps in designing secure container deployments.

Common Escape Vectors:

Case Study: CVE-2019-5736 (runc vulnerability)

A container escape vulnerability in runc allowed a malicious container to overwrite the host runc binary:

1. Container starts with a malicious entrypoint
2. Entrypoint waits for runc to open a file descriptor to /proc/self/exe
3. Container process uses /proc/[runc_pid]/exe to access host's runc binary
4. Overwrites runc with malicious binary
5. Next container start executes malicious runc on host

Mitigations:

• Update runc to patched version
• Read-only container layer
• AppArmor profile blocking /proc/[other_pid]/exe access

Case Study: Privileged Container Escape

# If container is privileged, escape is trivial:
docker run --privileged -it ubuntu bash

# Inside privileged container:
mount -t cgroup cgroup /mnt
echo 1 > /mnt/cgroup.procs  # Become member of host root cgroup
chroot /host
# Now have root shell on host!

# Or via kernel module:
insmod /host/path/to/malicious.ko